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George Frost Kennan is probably best known as the 
author of the “containment policy” which served as the 
overarching principle informing U.S. foreign policy 
during the Cold War. With the collapse of the Soviet 
empire in Eastern Europe in 1989 and the demise of the 
Soviet Union itself in 1991, very much along the lines 
that Kennan had foreseen when launching his policy 
recommendations in 1946, one might assume that the 
master's life and thoughts would be of consequence today 
only to historians of the Cold War, like his authorized 
biographer John Gaddis.
However, a second abiding concern of Kennan 
throughout his career was to defend the principle 
of interest-based foreign policy, or Realpolitik, as 
opposed to the moralistic-legalistic approach to policy 
formulation which prevailed in the American foreign 
policy community of his day. Since that very same object 
of Kennan's scorn, Wilsonian idealism, has become 
even further entrenched in the Washington of our day, 
Kennan's life and thoughts are also directly relevant to 
current politics in America. Moreover, as I will set out in 
this essay, there are issues surrounding Kennan's career in 
government service that are instructive as regards today's 
practices of recruiting and promoting top level planners 
and implementers of foreign policy. For these reasons, 
it is very good that in his biography of Kennan which 
came out last year Gaddis does not let his own persona 
intrude —put simply, he does not get in the way. He has 
thereby facilitated a growing discussion about Kennan in 
the professional community.
Gaddis has condensed and made accessible the vast 
written record left behind by a statesman turned scholar 
and public intellectual who had a very elevated opinion 
of his life's mission and, most exceptionally, saved for 
posterity all the contradictory drafts, correspondence, 
diary entries and finished policy papers that historical 
figures commonly purge to improve their image of single- 
mindedness if not saintliness.
Gaddis was unperturbed by the fact that Kennan 
himself produced a very readable and useful autobiography 
in two volumes when still at the top of his intellectual 
form. What he has done is to take the story forward into 
the final decades of a public life that continued to the ripe
age of 101. This meant evening out, pacing the narrative 
from birth to death very much as the master might have 
done himself from an afterlife.
Gaddis points out changes in Kennan's positions, the 
many zigzags that perplexed his contemporaries, but he 
is never judgmental. He draws on the many interviews 
he took from Kennan's family and colleagues to clarify 
points in the diaries or correspondence which are 
equivocal or easily subject to misreading. But as Gaddis 
tells us at the outset, he does not attempt to deal with the 
differing interpretations of Kennan that have accumulated 
in the extensive literature of previous biographies and 
other secondary literature.
Looking over Kennan's life as set out by Gaddis, I 
explore here a couple of questions relating to his career 
advancement and setbacks which have lessons for the 
Executive which nominates our senior diplomats and 
planners, and for the Senate which vets and approves 
them.
Before embarking on these various questions, I want 
to be very clear that any “broad implications” come up 
against the fact that George Kennan was extraordinarily 
gifted. He was a brilliant master of the English language 
in both spoken and written form, whose persuasiveness 
in presenting policy recommendations was freely 
acknowledged by his opponents as well as by his allies. 
This may explain why he was spared ad hominem attacks 
by his opponents in an age that was at least as bitterly 
polarized as our own.
Kennan was a very quick learner, a person with the 
ambition and the ability to fill all space made available to 
him, to move into new areas of activity with great self-
confidence and to perform usually at the highest levels. At 
the same time, Kennan had a nonconformist personality 
and an academic turn of mind which made it difficult for 
him to remain in place within a large organization like 
government service and ultimately took him to a research 
milieu on a university campus for the second half of his 
life, to everyone's relief, including his own.
* * *
The first of my questions is in what sense was
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Kennan an expert on Russia. After all, the notion of 
his expertise was fundamental to the acceptance and 
dissemination of his strategic policy-making at the height 
of his government career. And yet while Gaddis uses the 
term ”expert” repeatedly in relation to Kennan, he takes 
it for granted without question. The closest Gaddis comes 
is a remark on Kennan's draft for an unpublished book on 
government organization, written in 1938 when Kennan 
was stationed in Washington as a Russia specialist in the 
European Division: “Kennan's analyses of the U.S.S.R. 
were as sophisticated as anything available at the time. 
By the end of his first decade in the Foreign Service, he 
was explaining Russian society far better than Russians 
were doing for themselves.”
This contrasts with the biographer's evaluation of 
Kennan's commentary on the U.S. in the same document, 
which he concludes were ill informed and shallow. Was 
there genuinely a difference in Kennan's understanding 
of the one society and misunderstanding of the other? Or 
is it Gaddis's failure to see what might just have been 
flawed in Kennan's Russian expertise at this time?
At the very beginning of his comprehensive 
monograph, Know Your Enemy: The Rise and Fall 
of America's Soviet Experts (Oxford, 2009), David 
Engerman reminds us of a fact which bears directly 
on how and why George Kennan was a rare bird both 
in his generation of Foreign Service officers and in 
the generations which followed: “Even if government 
agencies had sought out Soviet expertise in the United 
States before World War II, they would have found 
precious little. There was no field of Russian Studies, just 
a handful of scholars, varying widely in interest, energy, 
training, and talents, spread thinly across American 
universities.” As Engerman sets out in detail, the whole 
discipline of Russian-Soviet studies in America got its 
start in the midst of the 1940s when academics were 
brought into classified military intelligence work. It was 
launched on a broad scale only when the Cold War set in.
Indeed, what expertise Kennan had when he joined 
the Bullitt mission to re-establish a U.S. embassy in 
Moscow in 1933 came from the special training he 
underwent in the Baltics and in Berlin as part of a newly 
created program within the State Department intended to 
give a very few young American diplomats the equivalent 
of postgraduate area studies training covering parts of the 
world which seemed to have prospective importance.
I find it regrettable that Gaddis chose to report 
extensively on Kennan's family background and 
childhood in the first 90 pages of the biography and then 
to cut out even the thin information about the nearly three 
years of Kennan's training for his life's work as a Russian 
expert that we can find in chapter 2 of the Memoirs, 
1925-1950. From the Memoirs, we know that Kennan's 
superiors in the State Department set the objective for his
academic studies in Berlin as follows: to give him the 
knowledge of the Russian language and history that one 
might have met with among the educated classes of pre-
revolutionary Russia. It was assumed that with this solid 
basis, he would learn whatever was needed about the 
contemporary Soviet Union at his diplomatic post. And 
this is an approach with which Kennan said he agreed, 
though he notes he had requested authorization to take 
courses on Soviet finance and political structure which 
were taught at a high level in Berlin at the time and was 
turned down by Washington.
In addition to one year's formal language training 
in the special department of the University used for 
preparing translators-interpreters for service in the 
German Foreign Office, in his second year Kennan 
followed regular Berlin University courses on history and 
studied language and literature with private tutors. The 
latter were mostly cultivated Russian emigres rather than 
qualified pedagogues. They gave him the Russian classics 
and readings in Kliuchevsky which appear to have served 
as the intellectual matrix for all his later writings inside 
and outside the U.S. government.
What are we to make of this pre-revolutionary 
Russian gentleman whom Kennan had become by way 
of his formal and informal training at State Department 
expense assuming the duties of political analyst in the 
diplomatic mission in Soviet Russia, not to mention those 
of strategic policy planner for Europe and the world in 
Washington in 1947?
First of all, it is obvious that his reliance on historians 
of imperial Russia in the liberal tradition, particularly 
Vasily Kliuchevsky, would have given Kennan a 
perspective on the country's trajectory dating from the 
1870s and 80s which took no account of the cataclysmic 
events that changed the course of state dramatically and 
established leadership structures of a new kind which 
themselves evolved over the course of the next two 
decades in unforeseeable ways. Notwithstanding his 
excellent Russian, upon taking up his duties in Moscow 
Kennan would have lacked the skills and knowledge base 
on Soviet Russia to be a full-fledged analyst, and he would 
have been unlikely to find on the job either colleagues 
or superiors to guide his progress in Sovietology in any 
systematic manner.
In the 1930s, especially, it would have been 
exceedingly difficult for embassy staff in Moscow to 
learn much more about the country of their assignment 
than if they had remained in Washington. Contacts with 
normal Russians were minimal. Their main activities were 
social engagements with other members of the diplomatic 
community, their daily concern was familial and trying to 
live normally in difficult conditions. To this, Kennan had 
health problems that were a constant concern.
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Kennan's unbalanced training and his personal 
predisposition to literature and artistic as opposed to 
scientific truth resulted in the verbose eloquence and 
frequent references to Dostoyevsky and Chekhov 
to predict and explain the behavior of Stalin and his 
henchmen via ”the Russian character” as he called it, or 
“the Russian soul,” the term by which this imaginative 
construct is more commonly known. This was the 
specific expertise which he wielded to great advantage. It 
was further buttressed in both his government and public 
writings by mining Gibbon and Shakespeare and other 
great thinkers on the human predicament.
In making these remarks, I am merely being 
descriptive, not deprecatory. Kennan himself would not 
have disagreed with the characterization, as we see from 
the following revelatory observation by him about what 
qualifications were needed for diplomatic service (as 
quoted by Engerman from Kennan's Princeton papers):
the judgment and instinct of a single wise and 
experienced man, whose knowledge of the world 
rests on the experience of personal, emotional and 
intellectual participation in a wide cross-section of 
human effort, are something we hold to be more 
valuable than the most elaborate synthetic structure 
of demonstrable fact and logical deduction.
However, the opposite of “fact and logical 
deduction” can easily be tautological reasoning. Literary 
citations may merely justify preconceived analysis and 
recommendations.
That Kennan was able to parlay such qualifications, 
which may be understandable for consular assignments 
or even higher embassy posts, into the top foreign policy 
planning position in the land says as much about those 
who employed him as it does about his own ambition and 
talent. In the Foreign Service of his day, which recruited 
from elite schools like his own Princeton, the notion of a 
well-rounded education and social grace was prioritized. 
Clearly a strong command of languages, English first, 
would be a major advantage. However, as Engerman 
makes plain, by the time Kennan made the statement 
cited (1950), he was becoming something of a dinosaur. 
Official Washington, with the support and cooperation 
of private donors in the Rockefeller Foundation and 
Carnegie Corporation, was turning to a fact-based, multi-
disciplinary approach to Russian and other area studies, 
first at Harvard and Columbia, then, with time, in many 
other university centers across the country.
In sum, it would be safe to say that the George 
Kennan who drafted the “containment policy” in 1946 
was relying heavily for inspiration on his own instinctive 
sense of Russia and the Russian people, including its top 
leadership. For him at this time, literary allusion trumped
factual knowledge. In the event, his judgments on Soviet 
intentions and capabilities were spot on. But that cannot 
allow us to ignore an important epistemological point.
Where Kennan's insight came from would be a mere 
curiosity were it not for the containment policy being the 
quintessence of a realist approach to foreign relations, 
which is supposed to be founded on detailed factual 
knowledge of the given area and interests in play, not 
derived from universalistic principles like its antithesis, 
idealism. The homework implicit in Realpolitik was 
never done. Kennan's reliance on artistic truth and 
personal vision held the possibility of greater conviction 
and prescience than would any tediously documented 
policy paper. At the same time, it left room for greater 
volatility and inconsistency in his writings.
The question of Kennan's Russian expertise contains 
within it one other: what did Kennan know and when? In 
effect, he became a fully-qualified expert on Russia in the 
period after he left government service, after his greatest 
contributions to U.S. foreign policy were made. Upon 
joining the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton 
and after publishing his Chicago lectures as American 
Diplomacy: 1900-1950, for which he was subjected 
by established scholars to searing criticism, Kennan 
resolved to make good on his conversion to academic 
life and researched according to the canons of the day 
his two critically acclaimed volumes on the early history 
of Soviet American relations, Russia Leaves the War and 
The Decision to Intervene which were both published in 
the mid-1950s. The speed with which he turned out these 
thick and heavily footnoted tomes, which, according 
to Gaddis, he wrote daily, in parallel with his archival 
readings, may raise questions as to whether the research 
followed or preceded his conclusions, but the works have 
stood the test of time.
The next issue which I think needs close treatment 
is exactly how Kennan, the charge d'affaires in the 
Moscow embassy, made his meteoric rise in 1946-47 to 
the very nerve center of Washington foreign policy and 
established paternity rights not only over what came to 
be called the ‘containment policy' but to a great deal of 
what became the Marshall Plan. Gaddis provides a lot 
of evidence and some telling observations along the way 
but does not draw them together conclusively. Let us 
try to do that now by revisiting the circumstances around 
his ‘Long Telegram,' which was Kennan's ticket to the 
highest foreign policy planning position in the Republic.
Kennan was patently not a team player. He was 
in the 1940s constantly trying to influence US policy 
towards Russia by reaching through, over and outside his 
bosses to get the ear of the President on the assumption 
that Ambassador Harriman was not conveying just how 
terrible Stalin's regime was and how the US should very 
quickly end the fiction of common objectives and do
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what was necessary to ensure post-war Europe took the 
form it desired irrespective of Russian preferences. He 
was fortunate to enjoy the protection of an ambassador 
who valued having a “heretic” on his staff and merely 
considered Kennan's writings as self-indulgent and 
impractical.
Kennan was a “realist” only in his analysis of what 
drove Soviet post-war policies; he was not a realist with 
respect to the possibilities for the American government 
to react, given the impossibility of changing policy on a 
dime in a democracy.
I would also note that what Kennan was 
recommending during WWII was not significantly 
different from what British Prime Minister Churchill 
was telling the American government at the same time, 
without any effect. Churchill was, of course, another 
practitioner of Realpolitik. Like Kennan his explanations 
of the behavior of the Soviet Union were based on gut 
feeling. And his eloquence was no less sublime. But 
Churchill's motives in international affairs were held in 
suspicion by Washington, which saw in them largely a 
cover for defense of British imperial interests.
Kennan put together his Long Telegram in response 
to a simple request from Washington to comment on the 
post-election speech by Stalin dated February 9, 1946 
in which the Soviet leader called for greatly increased 
military preparations, did not mention the Allies with 
respect to the recent war effort and repeated Marxism- 
Leninism doctrine to the effect that there could be no co-
existence between capitalism and socialism. Ambassador 
Harriman had already left his post, and Kennan used 
the opportunity to dispatch to the State Department a 
great deal more than the expected brief analysis of the 
speech. His 5,000 word analysis of Soviet intentions for 
post-war Europe was a bid to reach its mark without any 
intermediation and present a full-blown foreign policy 
doctrine. In the event, policy towards Russia was then 
in flux due to incremental American dissatisfaction with 
Soviet behavior on the ground and to the new President's 
growing readiness to break with his predecessor's policies 
and assert direct control over foreign policy. Thus, the 
soil was already well prepared for a policy statement such 
as Kennan produced. Events had caught up with him and 
his piece was perfectly timed to be useful.
Nonetheless, Gaddis correctly raises the question of 
why this piece by a relatively unknown Foreign Service 
officer was taken up with such alacrity in Washington. 
He remarks on the boldness of the paper, which set 
out its points in unqualified terms and advanced one 
solution without setting out any alternatives. This Gaddis 
contrasts with a recent policy review on Russia which the 
State Department had entrusted to Kennan's colleague 
Chip Bohlen and Geroid T. Robinson. Gaddis identifies 
Robinson as “a Columbia University historian of Russia
who had worked in the Office of Strategic Services during 
the war.”
In fact, Robinson was substantially more skilled in 
bureaucratic ways than this introduction suggests. He had 
been chief of the USSR Division within the OSS and had 
a reputation as a hard driving boss. His administrative 
skills were rewarded soon afterwards by his appointment 
as director of the newly created Russian Institute at 
Columbia University.
We are given to understand by Gaddis that the 
Bohlen-Robinson policy paper was indecisive and ended 
with several policy options, none of which was especially 
persuasive. Be that as it may, this type of format is 
what all hierarchical organizations demand. After all, 
decisions on strategy are supposed to be taken by an 
informed leader, not by a subordinate rapporteur.
We must bear in mind that at the time he wrote 
the Long Telegram Kennan was no longer ‘mentally' 
a Foreign Service officer. He had submitted his letter 
of resignation eight months previously and was in a 
suspended state pending career change. This may well 
explain why Kennan allowed himself to violate all 
organizational rules in his paper.
The Long Telegram gave coherence to a policy 
volte-face on Russia which was otherwise underway in 
Washington. Kennan had placed an all-or-nothing bet 
which was fortuitously timed and broke the bank. As a 
consequence, all doors were open to him in Washington.
In quick succession he was invited to join the newly 
created National War College to give the first course on 
strategic policy planning directed at senior officials of the 
various branches of the U.S. military and State Department 
in several decades. This was invaluable exposure within 
the government. He was then encouraged to popularize 
the newly adopted containment policy among the broader 
public through lectures and publications. This was the 
context for the ‘Mr. X' essay ‘The Sources of Soviet 
Conduct' which appeared in Foreign Affairs magazine 
in June 1947 with which Kennan's name was to be 
inalienably linked for decades.
In the spring of 1947, he was invited to head a new 
Policy Planning Staff reporting directly to Secretary of 
State George Marshall, which effectively set course on 
360 degrees of American foreign policy over the coming 
two and a half years.
It would neither be unkind nor untrue to say that 
Kennan was brought to power by the skills of a speech- 
writer, drawing on his native eloquence. But, we see 
from Gaddis that once he arrived at the center of power, 
Kennan made his unique contribution and earned his place 
in history thanks to his work as strategic planner. This 
was, I emphasize, a position for which he had received 
no specific training. Just as Kennan created his lectures 
for the War College by learning on the job, so he ran the
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Policy Planning Staff of 5, using it as a sounding board 
for analyses and recommendations that were nearly all his 
own and which he devised on the spot while reinventing 
himself. His methods were those of a highly gifted prima 
donna, not a collegial player. Moreover, he succeeded 
precisely because his boss, George Marshall, practiced a 
policy which is rare in large bureaucracies of putting most 
of his eggs in one basket. When Marshall was succeeded 
in office by Dean Acheson, the far more common habit 
of taking information and advice from multiple sources 
was implemented. Acheson also restored the traditional 
organogram with its deference to the chiefs of regional 
desks. Kennan then lost both his influence and his will 
to stay on in government service, which ultimately led 
to his early retirement at the start of the Eisenhower 
administration.
My remarks on the fit between Kennan's personality 
and the jobs he occupied in the government which 
emerges from Gaddis's biography should be leavened 
by one further observation from when my intellectual 
commitments intersected with Kennan's in the late 
1970s. At the time, Kennan was on the board of the
US Committee of East-West Accord and I was a junior 
member and contributor to its publications. The common 
objective was lobbying the U.S. Congress on behalf of 
a more constructive, less adversarial relationship with 
the Soviet Union, in favor of slowing, then reversing 
the strategic nuclear arms race. Kennan revealed at the 
time what Gaddis makes plain throughout his career in 
and out of government: a genuine affection for the object 
of his policy planning and research, namely Russia. At 
the time, such a mindset was held by a minority of the 
American foreign policy community. Today it is virtually 
nonexistent. I would be delighted if the restoration of 
Kennan's life and thoughts to active discussion today 
contributed to the rehabilitation of a more reasonable 
and open-minded approach to Russia as a legitimate 
permanent interlocutor for the United States in any 
collective approach to managing international affairs.
Gilbert Doctorow was a 2010-2011 Harriman Visiting 
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